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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change, the key environmental challenge of this century, is a
tough problem for law in many ways. The topic of this panel, instrument
choice, highlights a particularly difficult, important, and under-recognized
aspect of the climate change challenge: the difficulty of devising a
system of environmental law that combines the flexibility necessary to
deal with a changing world with the rigidity and accountability essential
to hold us to the difficult task of environmental protection.
Most of the presentations at this symposium focused on what policy
instruments might be best adapted to dealing with the problem of
greenhouse gas emissions over time. Controlling greenhouse gas emissions
is essential, but it is not enough. We must also think about climate
adaptation. The climatic changes to which we are already committed
seriously complicate our efforts to conserve something approaching a
“natural” world. If we are to have any hope of meeting our conservation
goals in the warmer world of the future, we will need conservation policy
instruments capable of rising to that challenge.
For purposes of this paper, I take for granted that Americans
overwhelmingly view environmental protection as a worthy goal. That
assumption is supported by the durability of our environmental laws and
by public opinion polling. Of course, Americans have other goals as
well, and would balance and prioritize those goals in various ways. My
point here is not to debate the appropriate level of conservation concern.
It is, rather, to take note of the difficulties we face in translating even
real and widely shared concern into sustained practice. As in other areas
of our life, short-term temptations can easily turn us from our long-term
goals.
Environmental law in general, and the conservation side of
environmental law in particular, have always been about finding ways to
resist temptation so that we might better achieve our sincerely-held
environmental goals. Environmental law is designed as a precommitment
device, deliberately tying us to our goals in ways that are difficult to
undo so that we might control our natural impulses to take more in the
short run than the earth can spare in the long term.
Societal precommitment is difficult under the best of circumstances,
because our governance system cannot literally tie us to the mast in
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imitation of Ulysses. It is even more difficult in a world that is changing
rapidly, and to some extent unpredictably, because we need to preserve
enough flexibility to respond to those changes.
In 1981, Barbara Walters caught flak for asking Katherine Hepburn on
national television what kind of tree she was.1 At the risk of inviting the
same sort of ridicule, I’ll use a tree metaphor. Environmentalists have
long idealized the law they prefer as an oak,2 standing strong to weather
the storms of short-term political temptation. Laws modeled on oaks
feature clear, enforceable mandates that allow little or no exception.
They eschew cost-benefit analysis, and limit implementing agency
discretion.3 As a model for law, oaks have both appealing and problematic
features. They are famously strong, but also rigid. They can stand
unswayed in powerful winds, but when the winds reach gale strength the
limbs of oaks may break off, and their trunks may topple.
Today we need a different tree model. The facile counterpart to the
rigid oak is the willow, whose limbs and trunk are said to bend enough
to withstand high winds but recover once the storm subsides. The willow
of this conventional tale displays part of what we need. Our legal
standards must be plastic in the sense of being able to deform without
breaking, but not so plastic that they take any form that seems momentarily
appealing.
The willow is not the perfect example, though, because it shows
resilience, returning to its prior equilibrium form once the wind eases.
Law in the form of a willow might provide an emergency exemption or
other by-pass procedure to be used in case of a short-term political
storm, reverting to its prior provisions once the storm passed. That is not
quite what climate change demands because the storm winds of climate
change, whether that refers to the changed climate itself or the political
pressure the changes will put on conservation efforts, will be steady and
unabating.4 A better tree model for that context is the conifers that grow

1. The question has since been repeatedly described as “what kind of tree would
you like to be?” Actually, Hepburn described herself as a tree, and Walters asked only
“What kind of tree are you?” YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_X2Xd1iOmM.
2. Coincidentally, Hepburn told Walters she would choose to be like an oak. See
id.
3. “ Legal oaks” are essentially what Amy Sinden calls “absolutes” or legal “trumps.”
Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1489 (2005).
4. As Richard Lazarus puts it with respect to climate legislation, any legislative
mandate will inevitably face “an unrelenting barrage of extremely powerful short-term
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on wind-swept ridges. Such trees adapt to the harsh conditions they face,
deforming permanently in the direction of the prevailing winds. They
look stunted by comparison to similar trees growing in more placid
locations, but they maintain their identity as trees and their ability to
hold together the soil, provide food and shelter for birds and animals,
and protect other plants from the fiercest gales. Laws based on the
conifer model are able to withstand sustained pressures by conforming to
external realities, but still bind us to long-term goals that are difficult to
achieve and in conflict with short-term economic interests. We have
little experience with that sort of law, and no clear model to follow. We
will need sustained and creative thinking to develop it. Here, I take a
first stab at that task—explaining why we have gravitated toward oaklike laws, showing why wind-swept pines are now a better model, and
offering some initial thoughts on what the sustained-wind-tolerant laws
of the future might look like.
II. ENVIRONM ENTAL LAW AS P RECOM M ITM ENT
Precommitment is a strategy long familiar to people who know they
may be tempted to take action they will later regret. Most famously, it is
the strategy of Ulysses, who had his sailors bind him to the mast of his
ship as it passed by the island of the Sirens, whose irresistibly beautiful
song caused sailors who heard it to throw themselves into the sea and
captains to wreck their ships trying to follow it.5 Of course, Ulysses’
strategy was not entirely rational. He could have stopped his own ears
with wax, as he did those of his sailors, to escape temptation altogether.
But Ulysses wanted to hear the sirens’ song without being harmed by it.
Perhaps we don’t always court temptation as directly as Ulysses did, but
often we find that temptation is essentially unavoidable.
A. Precommitments and Law
People use a variety of precommitment strategies to deal with
temptations they expect to encounter but fear they may not have the
discipline to resist.6 Precommitment simply means doing something now
economic interests” seeking its relaxation. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1153, 1158 (2009).
5. HOMER, T HE ODYSSEY 141–42 (W.H.D. Rouse trans., Signet Classic ed. 1999)
(1937).
6. For detailed descriptions and taxonomies of precommitment, see, e.g., Jon
Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities
of Precommitment, 81 T EX. L. REV. 1751 (2003); Thomas Schelling, Enforcing Rules on
Oneself, 1 J. L. ECON . ORG . 357 (1985); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES
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in order to increase the likelihood of taking (or not taking) another action
later. It may take the form of physically putting an act one wants to
avoid out of reach, like Ulysses having himself bound to the mast to
keep him from leaping overboard, or an army burning bridges behind it
to foreclose retreat.7 Where it is difficult to make an action physically
impossible, people may take a variety of steps that increase the costs of
changing their mind, such as telling other people about a commitment to
lose weight or quit smoking, joining a forced savings program, or agreeing
to exercise with others. Law is not necessarily a part of individual
precommitments, but it can play a role, providing enforceable sanctions
to back up a voluntary precommitment.8
Law itself can be the subject of collective precommitment. Indeed,
law, by its very nature, is precommitment, creating rules at one point in
time that determine the consequences of actions in the future with the
intent of encouraging or discouraging those future actions.9 The “rule of
law” promises those subject to the law that their future actions will not
be treated according to the political mood of those future times.10
Law is deliberately an imperfect precommitment device. It cannot be
made immune from change. Legal rules must always be subject to revision
and updating so that society can respond to changes in circumstances,
knowledge, and goals. But the difficulty of changing legal mandates can

RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 9–11, 36–37 (M aison des Sciences de l’Homme and
Cambridge University Press 1979) (1940).
7. See Elster, supra note 5, at 1761 (citing historical examples of armies burning
the means of retreat).
8. Some states, for example, have “casino self-exclusion” laws, which allow individuals
to formally place their names on a list of people who are subject to sanctions if found in
a casino are supposed to deny entry. See Cecil VanDevender, How Self-Restriction Laws
Can Influence Societal Norms and Address Problems of Bounded Rationality, 96 GEO . L.
J. 1775, 1779–81 (2008); Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How
Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 693, 748–54 (2003). A few others have adopted “covenant marriage laws”
allowing couples to choose a form of marriage that is more difficult to terminate. See
Chauncy E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock?,
25 U. ARK . LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 261 (2003).
9. John A. Robertson, “Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics,
and Constitutions, 81 T EX. L. REV. 1729, 1745 (2003).
10. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption,
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1600 (2007) (listing as “ruleof-law values” “clear mandates, legal stability, and distinct lines of accountability”);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)
(“[r]udimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes”).
IN
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be roughly calibrated to their intended durability. Constitutions are often
deliberately made difficult to change, so that the core values they embody
will not be undermined in the future by transitory passions.11 Supermajority
voting requirements are a popular procedural device to limit constitutional
amendments.12 Taxes may also be subjected to supermajority requirements
if voters suspect that they are otherwise too easily imposed,13 and decisions
to fund favored programs can be entrenched through similar requirements.14
Even without any special procedural barriers, law is always difficult to
change,15 requiring either overwhelming interest for a short period of time
or strong interest for a more sustained period.
Credible precommitment through law should provide two distinct
benefits. First, it should strengthen societal resolve, making it more likely
that we act in accordance with our professed societal goals, even in the face
of conflicting short-term desires or economic costs. Second, by providing
advance notice of the importance of following those goals, it should
encourage planning that can help us achieve them in a manner that
interferes as little as possible with other goals. Precommitment does,
however, pose the tricky challenge of striking the right balance between
rigid enforceability and flexibility. Commitments which are too rigid can
inhibit adaptive responses to new conditions.16 On the other hand,
commitments which are too tractable may be overcome by even mild
temptation.17
11. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9, at 1740–43.
12. See, e.g., Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1197–1200.
13. See, e.g., CAL . CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3 (requiring a two-thirds vote in each
house of the legislature for “any changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing
revenues collected pursuant thereto”).
14. California’s Proposition 98, passed in 1988, requires minimum funding for K14 education. Funding levels are determined by a complex series of formulas, and can be
reduced by a two-thirds vote of the legislature. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE , ANALYSIS OF
THE 2008-2009 BUDGET BILL , EDUCATION , INTRODUCTION : P ROP OSITION 98, http://www.
lao.ca.gov/handouts/education/2010/Overview_of_the_Prop_98_Budget_52710.pdf.
15. See Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1180 (describing the lawmaking
process in the U.S. as “deliberately cumbersome”); Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions,
19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL . L. 1, 21–24 (2003) (explaining how both human nature and
politics make law inherently resistant to change).
16. California’s supermajority requirements for raising taxes and approving budgets,
both imposed by initiative, are widely regarded as having rendered the state “dysfunctional.”
See, e.g., Ronald M . George, Initiatives Render California Dysfunctional, S.F. CHRONICLE ,
Nov. 1, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/11/01/
IN3H1ABI0R.DTL.
17. Rebecca Kysar notes, for example, that procedural rules intended to limit the
use of earmarks in Congress are frequently evaded. She attributes the ineffectiveness of
earmark rules primarily to the lack of extra-congressional enforcement mechanisms.
Rebecca M . Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 542 (2009). Another example is the escape valve for California’s
greenhouse gas emission reduction law, AB 32, which allows the governor to “adjust”
the law’s deadlines “[i]n the event of extraordinary circumstances, catastrophic events, or
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B. Precommitment in Environmental Law
Environmental conflicts have several distinctive characteristics. They
typically involve harm to the surrounding world that affects persons only
indirectly.18 Environmental injury often is slow to fully manifest,19 and
its nature, extent, and causes are frequently poorly understood.20
Environmental harm is typically the collective result of multiple
incremental actions, none of which individually appears blameworthy.
Moreover, the costs and benefits of environmental protection are frequently
asymmetrically distributed.21 In part as a result of that distribution, despite a
societal consensus that the environment merits some level of protection,
individuals strongly disagree about the desirable extent of protection and
what trade-offs it justifies.
Finally, much environmental protection and restoration work is valuable
only if it is durable over time.22 Temporal lags are one reason durability
is important. For example CO2 , the most important of the greenhouse
gases, remains in the atmosphere for a century or more, and its impacts
on the climate persist even longer.23 Restricting emissions for a short
time, therefore, would impose costs without providing significant benefits;
only long-term restraint can make a meaningful difference in the eventual
climate equilibrium, and that difference will not be detectable for some
time.24 The same is true for short-term attention to climate adaptation
problems.
threat of significant economic harm,” with none of those terms defined or limited. CAL .
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38,599(a).
18. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental
Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 744–45 (2000).
19. Id. at 746.
20. E.g., id. at 747; Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy,
22 STAN . ENVTL . L.J. 295, 318–20 (2003).
21. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 746; see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. M acey,
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG . 23, 29–31 (1996).
22. Doremus, supra note 20, at 326–27; DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING
SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 199, 202 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1999).
23. See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD . SCI. 1704, 1704–05 (2009).
24. Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL . L.J. 1295, 1316
(2009). Greenhouse gas accumulat ion in t he atmosphere is a “ s t ock/flow ” or more
colorfully a “bathtub” problem. Since CO2 is only very slowly removed from the atmosphere,
the level in the atmospheric “bathtub” will continue to increase even if the rate of input is
drastically cut. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 1164–66; John D. Sterman & Linda Booth Sweeney,
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But the need for durability can also be associated simply with the
difficulty and expense of reversing environmental harm, or with the
intangible nature of the rewards of environmental protection. I may be
willing to give up some economic benefits in order to protect the Delta
smelt, the American pika, or the Delhi sands flower-loving fly, but I
would feel like a prize chump if, despite my sacrifice, the next generation
carelessly destroyed those species. A big part of the point of protecting
the natural world now is to help future generations build the kind of
relationship with the natural world that will make them want to carry
on the protections. There is, therefore, an important sense in which
environmental law cannot accomplish its aims unless it persists for
generations.
Unfortunately, environmental problems are especially difficult to
grapple with, both initially and over time. The limitations of human
rationality are on full display in dealing with environmental harm.
Several psychological biases complicate our ability to respond rationally
to evidence of environmental harm, even when environmental protection
is recognized as an important goal. Temporal distance between action
and environmental effect plays into reluctance to accept immediate and
obvious costs in order to prevent longer-term and probabilistic risks.25
Uncertainty gives us room for wishful thinking, allowing us “to
underestimate the seriousness of problems, to overestimate the
effectiveness of efforts to solve them, and to assume that the future will
make them easier to solve.”26 Furthermore, environmental problems
are almost by definition collective action problems, resulting from
overconsumption of common resources. No individual can solve them
alone, and no “rational” self-interested individual will voluntarily reduce
her contribution without assurances that others will also do their part.27
Just as environmental problems bring out our individual human
failings, they also highlight the shortcomings of our political system. As
Richard Lazarus has pointed out: “Environmental protection laws are
invariably redistributive; they impose substantial costs on some and
confer substantial benefits on others. For that reason, the institutional
barriers to the enactment of such laws are particularly high.”28 That the

Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ Mental Models of
Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 215–16 (2007).
25. Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of
Environmental Law, 24 VA . ENVTL . L.J. 231, 237–39 (2005).
26. Doremus, supra note 20, at 320–21.
27. Id. at 324–26.
28. Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental
Law, 87 M INN . L. REV. 999, 1000 (2003).
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beneficiaries may be distant in both time and space from those who bear
the costs makes the political situation even more daunting.29
The passage of environmental legislation is always a minor political
miracle, but it is never the end of the story. Once law is enacted, it
benefits from the same barriers to lawmaking that make it difficult to
enact; it is tough to substantively amend existing law, even law that
faces serious political challenges. In order to achieve its goals, however,
environmental law must also resist the variety of under-the-radar tools
Congress has to draw the sting of facially powerful legislation, including
appropriations riders, funding limitations, and unpleasant oversight
hearings. That sort of durability has been challenging to engineer. As a
result, even ardent environmentalists are sometimes afraid to push the
law to its apparent environmental protection limits for fear that might
lead to repeal.30
Furthermore, there are many opportunities for “slippage” between
environmental law on the books and its implementation on the ground.31
Environmental problems are sufficiently complex, technical, and poorly
understood that the details of implementing environmental law must
generally be left to expert agencies, providing plenty of opportunities for
legislative purposes to be “lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
[. . .] bureaucracy.”32
The early architects of environmental law understood the danger of
slippage. They saw that agencies responsible for environmental laws
would be subject to political pressures from focused economic interests

29. Id.
30. See John Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of Interior: A Preliminary
View, 31 ENVTL . L. 199, 212–13 (2001); and see Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the
Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental
Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 60–61 (2001). One recent study suggests that this
phenomenon is not limited to political actors. See Lochran W. Traill et al., Pragmatic Population
Viability Targets in a Rapidly Changing World, 143 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 28, 29
(2010) (asserting that conservation organizations and conservation scientists are underestimating
conservation needs in their zeal to recognize political and financial realities).
31. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 297, 298 (1999) (“Slippage
between regulatory standards and the actual conduct of regulated parties is far from being a
peripheral element of the legal regime. What environmental lawyers do much of the time
could be considered ‘slippage management.’”).
32. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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seeking relief from regulatory mandates.33 They therefore built in a
series of precommitment devices designed to make it more difficult for
agencies to shirk their implementation duties. Citizen suit provisions
allow individuals to take enforcement into their own hands. Statutory
deadlines and mandates for agency action, coupled with judicial review
provisions and the availability of attorney fees to successful plaintiffs,
help interested parties hold the feet of reluctant agencies to the regulatory
fire.34
C. Sturdy Environmental Law Oaks
The most powerful way to combat slippage is to erect sturdy, inflexible
oak-like mandates. By limiting agency discretion, such mandates help
ensure that progress will be made toward environmental goals even in
the face of strong temptations to stray from the environmental mission.
Two well-known examples of such oaks are the Endangered Species
Act’s mandate to protect all species and the Clean Water Act’s antidegradation provisions.
1. Conserving the Uncharismatic
One way Congress has used regulatory oaks as precommitment
devices is to establish uncompromising goals before it is obvious who
will bear the costs of achieving those goals. A conspicuous example is
the Endangered Species Act’s requirement that virtually all species be
protected against human-caused extinction. The Act mandates the listing
of all species of animals or plants, no matter how uncharismatic, which
are in danger of extinction or likely to become so in the foreseeable
future.35 The only species ineligible for listing are insect pests “whose
protection . . . would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to
man.”36 Once listed, species are entitled to substantive protections strong
enough to have earned the ESA the sobriquet “pit bull of environmental

33. JOSEP H L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 88, 108–09, 239 (Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1971) (1970) (advancing the idea that relying solely on administrative agencies to
secure greater protections for the environment is misguided, and suggesting that the role
of the courts in such efforts might be profitably enhanced).
34. Even with such oversight mechanisms, slippage is possible at the level of the
courts. Farber, supra note 31, at 311–15.
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2006) (defining an “endangered species” as one which is
“in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range”); id. § 1532(20)
(defining a “threatened species” as one which “is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future”); id. § 1533(a)(1) (requiring that implementing agencies
“determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened species”).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
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law.”37 They may not be harmed without a permit,38 and federal agencies
may not take any action, including issuing such a permit, that would
jeopardize their continued existence or adversely modify their critical
habitat.39 The duty to list and the resulting regulatory protections are
enforceable through citizen suits if the agencies prove unwilling,40 and
citizen plaintiffs have not been reluctant to step forward.
There is a pressure relief valve on the prohibition against jeopardy, but
it is so difficult to use that it has almost never come into play. The Act
creates an elaborate process for invoking a group officially called the
Endangered Species Committee, popularly known as the “God Squad.”
Congress created the exemption process in 1979,41 in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s ruling that the Act prohibited completion of the Tellico
Dam.42 It allows federal agencies to ask the Secretary to empanel the
God Squad, which is composed of seven cabinet-level officials and a
representative from each affected state. The God Squad can grant an
exemption only if it finds, by a supermajority vote, that the project is of
regional or national significance, there is no reasonable or prudent
alternative, and the benefits of the project clearly outweigh those of any
alternative consistent with conservation of listed species.43 The process
has only been invoked a handful of times, and only once has it produced
an exemption.44 The God Squad therefore “satisfies one desideratum of a
good escape clause, namely, that it will never be used.”45

37. Donald Barry, then of World Wildlife Fund but later Assistant Secretary for
Fish and Wildlife and Parks in the Clinton Administration, is usually credited with coining
this description. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environmental Law May
Become Endangered Species, N.Y. T IMES, M ay 26, 1992, at A1.
38. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a) (prohibiting take); 1532(19) (defining “take” to
include harm); 1539(a)(1)(A) (authorizing issuance of incidental take permits).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g); 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
171–76 (1997).
41. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C).
42. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 434 U.S. 153, 193–95 (1977).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1).
44. See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad
New Law, in OLIVER A. HOUCK & RICHARD J. LAZARUS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES:
AN IN -DEP TH LOOK AT T EN LEADING CASES ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 132 (Foundation
Press 2005).
45. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some Ambiguities
and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 T EX. L. REV. 1751, 1776 (2003).
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Installing a safety valve that does not turn easily always carries the
risk that pressure may build up sufficiently to cause a blow-out elsewhere.
For legislation, there is always the less controlled option of congressional
repeal or targeted exemption. For the ESA, however, that avenue too has
been used only sparingly.46 Given the ferocity and persistence of
controversy over ESA implementation, the law has proven remarkably
durable.
There has of course been some regulatory slippage. The implementing
agencies have frequently fallen short, bowed to political pressures, or
attempted to soften the law’s impact.47 Slippage is invited by the high
degree of public controversy that has long attended the ESA, which
weakens the hand of the implementing agencies.48 But citizen litigation
46. Id. In addition, Congress authorized the Attorney General to waive the provisions
of the ESA and National Environmental Policy Act to the extent necessary “to ensure
expeditious construction” of a fence at the U.S.-M exico border, Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1996), Div. C, § 102(c), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended sporadically in U.S.C.)
and subsequently expanded that authority to allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to
waive “all legal requirements” that might stand in the way of fence construction, Pub. L. No.
109–13, Div. B, § 102, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended sporadically in U.S.C). In
the mid-1990s, Congress also placed a temporary moratorium on new listings, but that
freeze lasted only one year. M arcilynn Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of
New London, Babbitt v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U.
CIN . L. REV. 663, 677 n.83 (2006).
47. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental
Policy, 86 T EX. L. REV. 1601, 1604–09, 1613–17 (2008); see U.S. DEP T. OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INSP ECTOR GENERAL , REP ORT OF INVESTIGATION : T HE ENDANGERED SP ECIES
ACT AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY (Dec. 2008), available at http://
www.doioig.gov/images/stories/rep ort s /p df/Endangered%20Species %20FINAL%20
REDACTED5%20w_TOC_encryption.pdf; U.S. DEP T. OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF
INSP ECTOR GENERAL , REP ORT OF INVESTIGATION , JULIE M ACDONALD , DEP UTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY , FISH , WILDLIFE AND PARKS (Mar. 2007), available at http://doi.bluewatermedia.
com/pdf/M acdonald.pdf; J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 T EX. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003); Amy Whritenour Ando,
Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of
Regulatory Delay, 42 J. L. & ECON . 29, 30 (1999); M ary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the
Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as Applied to Endangered River Ecosystems, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 237–45 (1998); Andrew M etrick & M artin L. Weitzman, Patterns of
Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND ECON . 1, 9–11 (1996); David S.
Wilcove, M argaret M cMillan, & Keith C. Winston, What Exactly Is an Endangered Species?
An Analysis of the U.S. Endangered Species List, 1985-1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
87, 89–90 (1993); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation
by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO . L. REV. 277, 280, 288–
89 (1993); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FACTORS ASSOCIATED
WITH D ELAYED LISTING D ECISIONS 2 (1993); STEVEN L. YAFFEE , P ROHIBITIVE P OLICY :
IMP LEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SP ECIES ACT (The M IT Press 1982); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CED-79-65, ENDANGERED SP ECIES: A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE
NEEDING RESOLUTION (1979).
48. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 3, at 1507 (“Thus, even though Congress only
rarely steps in to directly alter the outcome of a dispute under the ESA, the knowledge of
that possibility colors virtually all negotiations under the Act, providing additional leverage to
economic interests.”).
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has frequently picked up the slack. Overall, there have been very few
extinctions on the ESA’s watch, many fewer than would have been
expected without the law.49
Conservation advocates are justifiably proud of the ESA’s success,
and rightly attribute that success largely to the rigidity of its oak-like
mandates. As Amy Sinden has explained, “absolute” environmental
mandates like the ESA help to correct the political power imbalance that
generally favors development over environment.50 Imagine that the law
merely required that the potential for adverse impacts on species be
studied and considered in deciding whether to act. Or even more starkly,
imagine that every conservation requirement had to pass a quantitative
cost-benefit test. I have little doubt that projects that seem economically
or socially important, or have a strong political constituency, would
move ahead under such a law, and uncharismatic or seemingly unimportant
species like fairy shrimp, suckers, and the Delhi Sands fly would disappear.
That would not indicate that development is always somehow “better”
for society than conservation, just that short-term focused interests tend
to enjoy greater political success than long-term diffuse ones.
How did such a tough and inflexible precommitment ever become
law? Part of the story is that the Congress that enacted the ESA did not
fully understand its scope or consequences. Although the language of the
statute is clear, some of its toughest provisions were added late in the
process, and departed substantially from past conservation practices.51
But even if the ESA’s strength had been fully anticipated, the law might
not have faced insurmountable political barriers. Its goal of preventing
extinction is one that few are willing to publicly oppose, and it was not
at all clear at the time of its passage, before species were listed or
projects affecting them identified, who would bear the costs of the
conservation it demands.

49. M ark W. Schwartz, Choosing the Appropriate Scale of Reserves for Conservation,
30 ANN . REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 83, 86–87 (1999); J. M ichael Scott et al., By the
Numbers, in T HE ENDANGERED SP ECIES ACT AT T HIRTY , VOL . 1 (Dale D. Goble, J. M ichael
Scott, and Frank W. Davis, eds., 2006).
50. Sinden, supra note 3.
51. The history of the ESA’s enactment is discussed in some detail in Holly
Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 WASH . U.
J. L. & POL ’Y 175, 186–92 (2010). See also Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the
Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental
Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 57 (2001).
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2. Maintaining Existing Environmental Quality
Another oak-like strategy is to demand that regulatory agencies or
states set standards based on current conditions, and to erect substantive
or procedural barriers against relaxing those standards. The Clean Water
Act provides an example. The Act mandates that states set water quality
standards for the waters within their boundaries.52 Those standards must
be sufficiently high to protect all existing uses,53 defined by regulation to
mean all uses actually attained on or after November 28, 1975.54 Uses
cannot be strategically broadly defined in order to make protecting them
easy; if a state has only one “fishable” designation, the standards it
imposes must protect its most sensitive fish.55 Each state must have an
antidegradation policy which “shall, at a minimum,” ensure that “[e]xisting
instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect
the existing uses shall be maintained and protected.”56 There is no provision
for removing existing uses.57 Designated uses which have not been
attained since 1975 can be removed, but only if their attainment has become
infeasible or if the controls that would be required to attain them”would
result in substantial and widespread economic and social impact.”58
Although the water quality standard and anti-degradation requirements
have been strong on paper for decades, until recently they played
relatively little role in federal pollution policy. In the early years of the
Clean Water Act, the EPA concentrated on developing and imposing
technology-based discharge limits on point sources, which must obtain
permits under the Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(known as NPDES permits). Recently, however, as it has become
increasingly apparent that technology-based requirements would not be
sufficient to achieve the Act’s objective of restoring and maintaining the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters,59

52. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a).
53. 40 C.F.R. §131.10. Uses may include such things as recreation, fish and
wildlife production, and water consumption for various purposes. A use is considered to
exist if the water is of high enough quality to support it. For example, shellfish production
may be an “existing use” even if no one has yet harvested the shellfish from that
location. EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1994) § 4.4, available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/handbook/chapter04.html#section4.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(e).
55. Craig N. Johnston, Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking Endangered Species
Seriously in Establishing Water Quality Standards, 33 ENVTL L. 151, 161 (2004) (citing
EPA’s Water Quality Standards for Idaho, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,162, 41,167–68 (July 31, 1997)).
56. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).
57. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(h)(1) (states may not remove existing uses unless they are
substituting a use requiring higher water quality).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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attention has turned to water quality standards. NPDES permits are
supposed to include water-quality based limits, in addition to technologybased requirements, if necessary to meet water-quality standards.60 In
addition, states are supposed to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs), which set a budget for pollutant inputs from all sources,
whether subject to permit requirements or not, for waters not meeting their
water quality standards.61 The TMDL program was virtually ignored by
EPA and the states until the mid-1990s when citizen litigation forced it
onto the front burner.62 It still suffers from a conspicuous Achilles
heel—there is no clear legal mandate for states to actually implement or
enforce their TMDLs.63 Nonetheless, environmental groups have come
to see water quality standards, coupled with the antidegradation requirement,
as another oak-like standard capable of forcing reluctant states to hold
the line at least against water pollution from point sources.
III. THE CLIM ATE CHANGE CHALLENGE
Greenhouse gas emission control, with all its political and psychological
complications, is the paradigmatic environmental problem. It highlights
the need for precommitment, as environmental law has always done. The
problem of conserving nature in the face of climate change adds another
twist. Climate change will make it impossible to achieve some current
conservation goals or meet some current standards. The climate change
conservation problem, therefore, highlights both the importance of
precommitment and the perils of rigidity. It calls for law in the form of
wind-swept pine rather than rigid oak.
60. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1312(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d), 122.44(d). Regulatory
slippage from this requirement has been rampant, but is now beginning to get attention. A
recent EPA review of NPDES permits for mountaintop removal coal mining operations
found that many of those permits lacked water-quality based provisions. U.S. EPA, Detailed
Guidance: Improving EPA Review of Appalachian Surface Coal M ining Operations
Under the Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and the Environmental
Justice Executive Order, Apr. 1, 2010, at 8–13, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/guidance/pdf/appalachian_ mtntop_mining_detailed.pdf. EPA has also promised to
review compliance of those permits with antidegradation requirements more carefully.
Id. at 13–14.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (9th Cir.
2002).
62. OLIVER A. HOUCK , THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW , POLICY , AND
IMP LEMENTATION 75–76 (Environmental Law Institute 2002) (1999).
63. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental
Law, 84 T UL . L. REV. 265, 300 (2009).
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A. Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions
It is hardly new ground at this point to say that climate change
mitigation, meaning the control of atmospheric greenhouse gas levels, is
the perfect storm of a political problem. Richard Lazarus calls it
“environmental lawmaking’s worst nightmare.”64 Jeffrey Rachlinski
pointed out ten years ago that climate change is a “social trap, a morass
that, because of its psychological characteristics, society is unlikely to
resolve through conventional approaches.”65 Buzz Thompson describes
it as “a classic example of the tragedy of the commons.”66
Biased assimilation of evidence about the causes, effects, magnitude,
and rate of global warming has, just as Professor Rachlinski predicted,67
polarized views about climate change to the extent that it is difficult to
have a civil, much less a productive, conversation about it in the political
arena. The invisibility, intangibility, and abstractness of climate change
combines with uncertainties to make it easy to ignore.68 Furthermore,
greenhouse gas emissions come primarily from deeply entrenched activities,
things we are used to doing and not used to regarding as harmful or
wrong.69 The losses from giving up, or even limiting, activities like
driving or using our electric devices appear far more real and immediate
than the potential gains of limiting climate change, especially when the

64. Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1184.
65. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL .
L. REV. 299, 300 (2000).
66. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL . L. 241, 253 (2000).
67. Id. at 305–07.
68. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1176–78; see also Rachlinski,
supra note 65, at 306 (“global climate change is a somewhat intangible harm that can
only be understood in the context of scientific theory”). This sort of invisibility seems to
have played a role in the vulnerability of belief in climate change to the political whims
or news stories of the moment. According to respected polls, American’s confidence that
climate change is a real phenomenon has fluctuated widely over the last few years.
Gallup reported in M arch 2010 that the percentage who believe the media generally
exaggerates the seriousness of global warming is up to 48%, and that although 53% still
believe that global warming is real, that number is at its lowest value since 1997. Frank
Newport, Americans’ Global Warming Concerns Continue to Drop, GALLUP, M ar. 11, 2010,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126560/americans-global-warming-concerns-continue-drop.aspx.
The most recent Pew Research Center poll found that only 37% of Americans see climate
change as a very serious problem, down from 47% in 2007. P EW RESEARCH CTR, PEW
GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT (2010), http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popularabroad-than-at-home/9/#chapter-8-environmental-issues. On the other hand, in a June 2010
Stanford University poll, 74% of respondents said that in their personal opinion global
warming is happening, 75% of those attributed it primarily to human action or to human and
natural causes equally. STANFORD UNIVERSITY , GLOBAL WARMING POLL (2010), http://woods.
stanford.edu/docs/surveys/Global-Warming-Survey-Selected-Results-June2010.pdf.
69. Biber, supra note 24, at 1317–20.
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losses must be suffered now and the gains will not be realized until the
distant future.70
One of the biggest challenges climate change poses is to the durability
of policy efforts. Global warming didn’t happen quickly; it has been
building since the industrial revolution, when anthropogenic emissions
of greenhouse gases began to accelerate. Nor can it be reversed quickly,
because of the bathtub effect and the difficulties of reversing macro climatic
changes. That means that the economic costs of climate mitigation policy
must be borne for many years before they produce tangible environmental
or economic benefits.71
That temporal disconnect makes it especially tempting to ignore the
problem, and therefore makes precommitment especially important. Richard
Lazarus has proposed an ingenious “chutes and ladders” approach, coupling
strategies designed to inhibit legal change benefitting disproportionately
powerful short-term economic interests with other strategies designed to
ease legal changes benefitting the objectives of more diffuse long-term
interests.72 Eric Biber agrees that it would be desirable to “lock-in”
emission regulations through law and other mechanisms.73
B. Conservation in a Changing World
The other side of the climate change coin is sometimes called “adaptation”
—learning to live with the changing climate.74 Adaptation, broadly
speaking, encompasses adjustment to the many impacts greenhouse gas
accumulation will bring, including temperature change, sea level rise,

70. Biber, supra note 24, at 1320–21; Thompson, supra note 66, at 262–64; Gordon C.
Winston, The Reasons for Being of Two Minds: A Comment on Schelling’s “Enforcing Rules
on Oneself,” 1 J. L. ECON . & ORG . 375, 377–78 (1985) (noting that people myopically
discount future benefits); R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility
Maximization, 23 REV. ECON . STUD . 165, 165–68 (1955).
71. See Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1167 (“The time lag is at the very
least longer than the lifetime of any adult. The upshot is that no one who is asked to
curtail activities to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations will be likely to live long enough to
enjoy the benefits of that curtailment.”).
72. Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1206–30.
73. Biber, supra note 24, at 1338–42. Because he is skeptical that any of these
mechanisms w ill p rove effective, however, P rofes s or Biber also suggests that costly
regulations should be coupled with efforts to make more rapid inroads on the most obvious
problems caused by climate change. Id. at 1342–60.
74. See, e.g., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
IMP ACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/
reports/scientific-assessments/us-impacts.

61

D OREMUS (D O N O T D EL ET E)

3/7/2016 11:27 AM

precipitation shifts, more intense storm events, potential shifts in disease
ranges, increased fire risk, and more.75 Much adaptation work is, not
surprisingly, focused on climate change’s impacts on human health, water
supply, agriculture, transportation systems, and urban communities. For
purposes of this paper, however, I am particularly interested in a different
aspect of adaptation: conservation of the non-human world.
Conservation, because it is at best only tenuously connected to
tangible benefits to people, has always been an especially challenging
political sell. Its advocates, therefore, have been especially enamored of
rigid, oak-like legal mandates. But climate change promises to bring the
kind of sustained high winds that threaten to topple those oaks, leaving
nothing standing in their stead.
Climate change dramatically expands the scale on which conservation
policy needs to be conducted. Many current climatic conditions will
disappear entirely, while conditions with no current analogue will
appear.76 Based on these changes, one widely-cited study estimates that
eighteen to thirty-five percent of species worldwide may already be
committed to extinction.77 That study provides only a rough guess; it has
been criticized for failing to take into account the ability of species to
disperse to new areas, adapt to environmental change, or evolve in
response to selection pressures.78 It and other climate envelope models
“provide an upper limit on the number of extinctions that might be
possible rather than the number that might be expected.”79 While a great
deal of uncertainty remains,80 it is generally expected that climatic shifts
will tear ecological communities apart, placing many more species and
ecosystems at risk than are currently protected.81 There is little doubt
75. Id.
76. John W. Williams, Stephen T. Jackson and John E. Kutzbach, Projected Distributions
of Novel and Disappearing Climates by 2100 AD, 104 PROC. NAT. ACAD . SCI. 5738 (2007).
77. Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145
(2004).
78. Luis-M iguel Chevin, Russell Lande & Georgina M . M ace, Adaptation, Plasticity,
and Extinction in a Changing Environment: T owar ds a Predictive Theory, 8 PLO S
BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2
Fjournal.pbio.1000357.
79. Nigel E. Stork, Re-as s es s ing Cur r ent Extinction Rates , 19 BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION 357, 364 (2010).
80. It is extremely difficult to model adaptive responses, especially on the scale of
large number of species, although work is beginning on that task. Chevin et al., supra note 78.
On the other hand, synergistic interactions between climate change and more traditional
threats might make the effects of climate considerably worse than anticipated. Stork, supra
note 79, at 367.
81. Stork, s upr a not e 79, at 364; St uart L. P imm, Climate Disruption and
Biodiversity, 19 CURRENT BIOLOGY R595, R597–98 (2009); JB Ruhl, Climate Change
and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 17–26 (2008); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked
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that future demands will strain the resources available for conservation,
which have long been stretched thin.82
Climate change challenges current conservation methods and goals.
Current goals are commonly tied to the preservation of existing conditions,
or the restoration of conditions thought to have existed at some historical
reference point. Examples include the preservation or recovery of viable
populations of native species,83 the preservation of iconic landscapes in
what is believed to have been their historical condition,84 and the
maintenance of biological integrity, diversity and environmental health.85
The reality of climate change untethers conservation goals from history.
It simply will not be possible to protect the world that has been. Not all
species can be saved from extinction in a rapidly-changing world, even
with strong regulatory restrictions and expensive restoration measures.
The same is true for water quality; the lessons of the past no longer
predict the world of the future. As a result, standards bent on preserving
or restoring the past are likely to become uncomfortable strait jackets.
As described above, water quality standards must protect existing uses,86
to Global Clim ate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87
NEB. L. REV. 833, 844–49 (2009).
82. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 M INN . L. REV. 1171 (1998).
83. The purposes of the ESA are “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide
a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species,” and
to fulfill the purposes of international agreements. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The ESA defines
both conserve and conservation as “the use of all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which” it
no longer qualifies as endangered or threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
84. The purpose of the national parks is “to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in
such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.” 16 U.S.C. § 1.
85. This is the current mandate of the National Wildlife Refuge System. 16 U.S.C.
§ 668dd(a)(4)(B). A lt hough it s ounds more exp ans ive and les s tethered to historic
conditions than t he ot hers, the directive to “maintain” integrity, diversity and health
points to a historic conditions mindset. That certainly appears to be the way the Fish and
Wildlife Service understands it. The agency has issued a policy defining both biological
integrity and environmental health by reference to historic conditions, which are defined
as the “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from natural
processes that we believe, based on sound professional judgment, were present prior to
substantial human related changes to the landscape.” U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
M ANUAL , 601 FW 3, available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.html. See also Brian
Czech, A Chronological Frame of Reference for Ecological Integrity and Natural Conditions,
44 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 1113 (2004) (arguing that the relevant reference period is just
prior to the industrial revolution).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 52–57.
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which effectively means that they must maintain historic water quality
conditions that supported those uses. That is an entirely sensible demand
with respect to pollution from factory outfalls, or even nonpoint source
pollution from farm or timber harvest operations. It is problematic,
however, for water quality conditions that are directly sensitive to climate
change. Air temperature, which is increasing worldwide as a result of the
greenhouse effect, directly affects water temperatures. In streams that
support cold-water fish, notably salmonids, water temperature is an
important quality parameter.87 Furthermore, as the temperature warms,
oxygen is driven out of the water, reducing its availability for aquatic
life.88
Concurrently, as atmospheric carbon dioxide increases, more of it
dissolves in water. The oceans are the major sink for removing
anthropogenically-generated carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.89
That has moderated the warming effects of greenhouse gas emissions to
this point, but at the cost of significantly altered ocean chemistry.90
Dissolved carbon dioxide reacts with water to form carbonic acid,
lowering the pH of the water and reducing the availability of calcium
carbonate, a key ingredient in the shells of many marine organisms.91
The pH of the oceans has fallen noticeably since the industrial revolution,
and continues to decrease. The ecological effects of ocean acidification
are complex and still poorly understood,92 but appear significant.

87. EPA, REGION 10, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA REGION 10 GUIDANCE FOR PACIFIC
NORTHWEST STATE AND T RIBAL T EMP ERATURE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, EPA 910B-03-002, iii (Apr. 2003), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/water.nsf/6cb1a1df
2c49e4968825688200712cb7/b3f932e58e2f3b9488256d16007d3bca/$FILE/TempGuidance
E PAFinal.pdf (“Water temperature is a critical aspect of the freshwater habitat of Pacific
Northwest salmonids. Those salmonids listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA
and other coldwater salmonids need cold water to survive.”). See also Craig N. Johnston,
Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking Endangered Species Seriously in Establishing Water
Quality Standards, 33 ENVTL . L. 151, 153–54 (2004) (“High temperatures can lead to a
host of ill effects in salmon, including elevated risks of disease, fatality, increased
predation, and barriers to migration.”). Johnston describes Oregon’s temperature standards,
which establish a series of temperature tiers depending on the species and what they use
the area for, and EPA’s guidance document, which has an even more elaborate set of
tiers. Id. at 156.
88. Robin Kundis Craig, The Clean Water Act on the Cutting Edge: Climate Change
and Water Quality Regulation, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T., 14, 14 (Fall 2009); E.g.,
Gary Shaffer, Steffen M alskaer Olsen & Jens Olaf Pepke Pedersen, Long-Term Ocean
Oxygen Depletion in Response to Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuels, 2 NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 105, 105–09 (Jan. 25, 2009).
89. Christopher L. Sabine et al., The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2, 305
SCIENCE 367, 367 (2004).
90. Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN .
REV. M ARINE SCI. 169, 170 (2009).
91. Id. at 172–74.
92. Id. at 174–80.
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Water quality is also affected by sea level rise, which will increase salt
concentrations in estuaries and coastal aquifers. “Because many species
have a limited tolerance for salinity change, a long-term salinity increase
may irreversibly damage estuarine ecosystems. . . . Rising salinity may
also contaminate water supplies for drinking and industry, jeopardizing
the livelihood of coastal communities.”93 Where climate change reduces
precipitation or alters its timing, reduced river flows into estuaries could
exacerbate increased salinity.94 Climate change is also expected to alter
the mixing behavior of lakes, making some more likely to completely
mix throughout the year and others more likely to stratify into distinct
temperature and water quality zones.95
Finally, climate change will alter runoff and streamflows, changing
water quality both directly and indirectly. Many regions, including the
southwestern U.S., are expected to become more arid over the next
several decades. Reducing streamflows, which are already stressed by
high demand for water for human use, will further concentrate pollutants.
Climate change is also expected to increase the vulnerability of some
areas to extreme storm events.96 More intense storms will increase runoff, and the pollution load run-off carries to streams.97
Climate-driven water quality changes will challenge adherence to
water quality standards in much the same way that climate-driven threats
to the biota will challenge the ESA’s mandate to protect all species.
Consider, for example, management of the Central Valley Project and
State Water Project in California. The two projects divert enormous
quantities of water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River system for
irrigation and municipal use. Water quality standards for salinity in the
San Francisco Bay-Delta estuary into which the rivers empty, are a key

93. T.W. Hilton et al., Is There a Signal of Sea-Level Rise in Chesapeake Bay
Salinity?, 113 J. GEOP HYSICAL RESEARCH C09002 (2008).
94. JAY LUND ET AL ., ENVISIONING FUTURES FOR THE SACRAMENTO -SAN JOAQUIN
DELTA 52–54 (2007).
95. Peeter Noges, et al., Impact of Climatic Variability on Parameters Used in Typology
and Ecological Quality Assessment of Surface Waters—Implications on the Water Framework
Directive, 584 HYDROBIOLOGIA 373, 376–77 (2007).
96. U.S. Climate Change Science Program, Analyses of the Effects of Global Change
on Human Health and Welfare and Human Systems, Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6,
at 20–22 (Sept. 2008), available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap4-6/sap4-6final-report-all.pdf.
97. Craig, Cutting Edge, supra note 88.
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constraint on project operations,98 and have been a focal point of political
controversy for many years.99 Initially, the salinity standards were
adopted to protect farmers who draw irrigation water directly from the
Delta. Today, however, they are also considered important to protecting the
Delta smelt, which is listed as threatened under the ESA.100
By making it more difficult to achieve the salinity standards, climate
change will make the pumps increasingly vulnerable to legal challenges
under the CWA, ESA, and California’s analogous state laws. The pumps
are crucial to California’s water supply, supplying not only the lion’s
share of agricultural irrigation water but also municipal supplies for
more than half of California’s population.101 Any legal decision that
significantly reduces pumping puts the laws that produce it at as much
risk as the water supply.102

98. See, e.g., Letter from Lester Snow, Director, California Department of Water
Resources, and Don Glaser, Regional Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to Dorothy
R. Rice, Executive Director, California State Water Resources Control Board, (Feb. 5, 2009)
(requesting temporary urgency relief from salinity standard), available at http://www.water.
ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2009/020509dwrswrcb.pdf.
99. See M ichael Hanemann and Caitlin Dyckman, The San Francisco Bay-Delta:
A Failure of Decision-Making Capacity, 12 ENVTL . SCI. & POL’Y 710, 710 (2009); Elizabeth
Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO . L. REV.
341, 345–46 (1996).
100. In its most recent Biological Opinion on operation of the water projects, FWS
imposed a number of controversial restrictions on pumping designed to maintain “X2,” the
point in the Delta where the salinity level is two parts per thousand, at specific locations.
See U.S. DEP T. OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE , FORMAL ENDANGERED
SP ECIES ACT CONSULTATION ON THE PROPOSED COORDINATED OP ERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL
VALLEY P R OJEC T (CVP ) A N D STA TE W A TE R P R O JE C T (SWP ), http://www.fws.gov/
sacramento/es/documents/SWP-CVP_OPs_BO_12-15_final_OCR.pdf; FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW , T HE CONSOLIDATED D ELTA SMELT CASES, 1:09-CV-00407
OWW DLB (E.D. Cal., M ay 27, 2010).
101. GOVERNOR’S DELTA VISION BLUE RIBBON T ASK FORCE , OUR VISION FOR THE
CALIFORNIA DELTA 2–3 (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://deltavision.ca.gov/BlueRibbon
TaskForce/FinalVision/Delta_Vision_Final.pdf.
102. When biological opinions issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service and National
M arine Fisheries Service required that pumping be ramped down to protect endangered
and threatened fish, several California legislators called for amendment of the ESA or
convening of the God Squad. Press Release, Radanovich: CA Agriculture Victim of Economic
Eco-Terrorism in the F orm of t he Endangered Sp ecies A ct , F eb. 4, 2009, http://
radanovich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=110301; Press Release,
Hollingsworth, Republicans Urge Governor to Call for Convention of “God Squad,” Feb.
11, 2009, http://cssrc.us/web/36/ news.aspx?id=5422. After first demanding a National
Research Council review of the biological opinions, Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein
joined the call to relax the ESA’s restrictions. Bettina Boxall, Feinstein Seeks to Ease
Curbs on Water Delivery to Farmers, L.A. T IMES, Feb. 12, 2010. The law has so far
withstood these attacks, but its supporters can’t be blamed for being nervous.
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IV. DESIGNING MORE P LASTIC LAWS
It has never quite been true that we could preserve or restore the
nature of the past. But it has been close enough to the truth that
mandates to protect all species and maintain all water quality have
served as effective aspirational commitments,103 helping us hew to our
conservation goals in the face of economic temptations. They have, in
other words, been sturdy oaks.
In the warming future, however, reality will be so distant from those
goals that rather than stiffen our resolve they are likely to incite their
own rejection. As Robin Craig has pointed out, the familiar goals of
preservation and restoration are so far from being attainable in our
changing world that clinging to them risks making law and the
conservation effort behind it appear futile.104 Politically, it seems that
nothing could be worse these days than for legally mandated and costly
environmental protection efforts to be proven ineffective, or even not
proven effective.105 To avoid that fate, standards must acknowledge the
new reality without making our conservation commitment completely
illusory.
There is reason to be skeptical that law can produce the needed
combination of flexibility and rigidity. As Robert Frank has said in a
different precommitment context: “any contract lenient enough to allow
termination of a hopeless marriage cannot at the same time be strict
enough to prevent opportunistic switching.”106 Clever governance strategies
will never be sufficient by themselves to combat temptation. Unless
people care, now and in the future, about conservation, society simply
will not bear the costs conservation imposes. The first concern of
103. Nagle, supra note 82 (noting the usefulness of ESA’s aspirational goals);
Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and
Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 99, 120–24 (2006) (explaining that Clean Air
Act’s “overstated mandates” to limit air pollution to unachievable levels have served as a
“thumb on the scales” helping to correct political power asymmetries).
104. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 9, 33–35 (2010);
see also J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL . L. 363, 394 (2010) (“The stationarity premise and all on
which it is based, however, are going to fall to pieces in the era of climate change.”).
105. See, e.g., Craig M anson and Brandon Middleton, Shutting Off the Water Pumps to
Save Delta Smelt Unwarranted, S.F. CHRON ., Jan. 8, 2009 (complaining that “there is
nothing close to a guarantee that increased pumping restrictions will help the delta smelt”).
106. ROBERT H. FRANK , PASSIONS WITHIN REASON : T HE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 195 (1988).
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conservation advocates, therefore, should be to facilitate and build
emotional connections between people and nature.107 That does not
mean, however, that law is unimportant. Although they are not sufficient
by themselves, legal pre-commitments remain necessary because we can
be distracted from our genuine commitments by other interests that
appear more pressing at the moment. While law cannot substitute for
emotional attachment, it can limit the extent to which we stray from the
goals dictated by that attachment.
A combination of substantive and procedural strategies are needed to
create and sustain law in the form of wind-swept pines.108 Below I
outline some possibilities. This is, of course, only a first cut at a vexing
question. No doubt others will have more creative strategies to propose.
A. Avoiding Temptation
Before discussing what less rigid conservation laws might look like, it
is worth briefly considering a different sort of precommitment strategy.
In addition to steeling our resolve to withstand temptation, we should
avoid temptation to the extent possible. Avoidance can be an effective
strategy for those who lack the strength of will to resist temptation; indeed it
may be the only effective method if a strong precommitment strategy
cannot be devised. Conservation is a prime candidate for an avoidance
strategy, because we know we are likely to be vulnerable to the temptation
to forego it in favor of short-term economic benefits, and we also know
that our precommitment mechanisms can no longer be as unbending as
oaks.
In this context, avoidance implies three things. First, it means bringing
the entire range of policy instruments into play, so that political stress is
shared rather than being concentrated on a few burly regulatory oaks.109
Second, it means reducing traditional stresses as much as possible, so
that systems are better able to withstand the stresses associated with
climate change.110 Third, it means minimizing the extent of climate
change through robust efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions.
107. Law can have a role in that process. See generally Holly Doremus, Shaping the
Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (2003).
108. Combining substantive and procedural measures to achieve effective environmental
protection is, of course, not a new idea. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 3, at 1492 (noting
that ESA’s procedural provisions make the substantive standards “difficult to evade”).
109. Pat Parenteau has explained some of the potential pathways of adaptation for
water resources involving mechanisms other than familiar regulatory law. See Patrick
Parenteau, Come Hell and High Water: Unavoidable Consequences of Climate Disruption,
34 VT. L. REV. 957 (2010).
110. See Glicksman, supra note 81, at 889 (recommending that federal land managers
“buttress natural capacity to withstand climate change stresses” by addressing other stresses).
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Although we cannot wholly avoid climate change and its consequences
for nature, any limit on emissions will limit the extent of those
consequences. That, in turn, will reduce the number of unpalatable
choices we must make between conservation and economic benefits or
societal comfort.
Of course, there are already numerous efforts underway to craft
climate mitigation policy. The point here is two-fold. First, mitigation
and adaptation policy are intimately linked; the more aggressively we
approach the former, the less need we will have for the latter. Second,
our conservation oaks may have a role to play in catalyzing mitigation
efforts. Rigid legal mandates, even when they cannot alone develop
effective policy for the future, can draw needed attention to the
shortcomings of current policy. The ESA has, for example, helped
trigger reform of Texas water law, and several creative federal restoration
efforts.111 The apparent impossibility of meeting the ESA’s mandate to
save all species and the CWA’s antidegradation requirement indicates
how serious the conservation problem has become. Those mandates can
bring to the table interests that otherwise might be inclined to ignore the
conservation problem. It is no impediment to this function that neither
the ESA nor the CWA provides a workable structure for prioritizing
greenhouse gas reductions.112 Indeed, the misfit between legal mandates
and desirable mitigation policy may even strengthen their catalytic
effect.113
111. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2001) (ESA has been the catalyst
for dramatic shift in environmental law to focus on restoration); Todd H. Votteler,
Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or the Beginning of the End of the Fifty Years of Conflict Over
the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 T UL . ENVTL . L.J. 257, 276–78 (2002) (ESA litigation
requiring protection of endangered species living in springs in Edwards Aquifer triggered
Texas legislation to regulate pumping from the aquifer for the first time in t he s t at e’s
history); Robert Jerome Glennon and John E. Thorson, Federal Environmental Restoration
Initiatives: An Analysis of Agency Performance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIZ.
L. REV. 483, 523 (2000) (noting that federal restoration efforts have been triggered by
violations of water quality and endangered species laws). But see Holly Doremus and A.
Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 279, 348 (2003) (experience in the Klamath River Basin “suggests that, at best, the
ESA is an uneven, weak catalyst”).
112. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 81, at 40–49 (noting difficulties of applying ESA to
limit greenhouse gas emissions).
113. See Holly Doremus, Polar Bears in Limbo: How a Legal Morass Could Save
the Environment, SLATE , May 20, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2191707/pagenum/all/#p2
(“Laws that don’t quite fit can force us to pay attention to important problems and
develop better tools for dealing with them.”). Of course, if the mandate is too unyielding
and appears too ill-suited to the problem, the response might instead be its immediate
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While the ESA and CWA oaks are no doubt not sustainable in the
long run in a warming world, in the short run they remain sticky. Indeed,
they may be more firmly entrenched than many other mandates because
they have dedicated environmental interest support, and because they
embody intuitively appealing goals. They will eventually have to be
relaxed, but they should not be lightly surrendered. They should be
bargained away only for the right price, which should include significant
and credible greenhouse gas emission reductions.
B. Substantive Strategies
While avoidance is worth pursuing, it cannot be a complete solution
given the extent of the climatic changes to which the globe is already
committed. We must also plan to replace our legal oaks with wind-swept
pines that will be more durable for the long term. The most difficult
challenge of that process is devising substantive standards that relax the
oak-like rigidity sufficiently to pragmatically accommodate the conditions
of the real, warming world, yet remain clear and meaningful enough to
provide some check on administrative discretion.114 There is no need to
find a single, silver bullet standard with just the right amount of
plasticity. Combining a variety of standards, and adding on procedural
protections, will likely prove necessary.
1. Moving Baselines
One possibility is to adopt goals which themselves shift to
acknowledge climate change, much as the branches of a pine growing on
a windy ridge grow in the direction of the prevailing winds rather than
constantly fighting those winds. That might imply accepting the impacts
of climate change as part of the “natural” background, and therefore
exempting them from regulation. Robin Craig has generally suggested
this approach,115 but has not evaluated precisely how it would play out in
the current legal environment. Characterizing climate change as natural
repeal. That calculation can be difficult to make. A somewhat cautionary note comes
from the Clean A ir A ct, w here EP A, despite moving fairly gingerly with respect to
greenhouse gas regulation in the wake of M assachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007),
barely survived an attempt to repeal that regulatory authority in the U.S. Senate. Carl
Hulse, Senate Rejects Republican Effort to Thwart Carbon Limits, N.Y. T IMES, June 11,
2010, at A22.
114. As Oliver Houck has written, we need standards sufficiently precise and robust
that they are capable of wrestling “potentially limitless questions of scale, time, baselines, and
scientific complexity to the ground” and “the most powerful economic forces in the country,
if not to the ground, to something closer to a draw.” Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 M INN . L. REV. 869, 883 (1997).
115. Craig, Stationarity, supra note 104, at 38.
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would make no legal difference to ESA implementation, because the
ESA requires listing of species threatened by any cause, whether natural
or anthropogenic.116 It would be easier to work a “moving baseline” into
the CWA’s antidegradation requirement, but regulatory changes would
still be required. As explained earlier, the antidegradation rules do not
permit the removal of designated uses that are being achieved, or have
been since 1975.117 They do permit removal of uses that have been
designated but not yet achieved if, among other things, natural conditions
make their achievement infeasible. If climate change were recognized as
making “nature” a moving target, it would make conceptual sense to apply
the same “natural conditions” exception to uses that were once established.
A “moving baseline” approach to climate change impacts has been
proposed for the European Water Framework Directive.118 Like the
Clean Water Act’s antidegradation policy, the Water Framework Directive
requires that European states prevent deterioration of the quality of their
water bodies.119 Further, it requires that member states “protect, enhance
and restore” their waters “with the aim of achieving good surface water
status” by 2015,120 subject to certain exceptions, particularly for waters
so physically modified that their character has been substantially
changed.121 Annex V to the Directive details the elements to be considered
in evaluating the status of a water body. Essentially, water bodies are
classified by type, and their condition compared to reference conditions
for that type of water body in a pristine state.122 Good ecological status
is achieved when there is only slight deviation from the quality expected
for those elements “under undisturbed conditions.”123

116. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(E) (requiring that Secretaries of Interior and Commerce
determine whether species are endangered or threatened by reason of, among other things,
“other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence”).
117. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
118. T HE EUROP EAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROP EAN UNION ,
DIRECTIVE 2000/60/EC: ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE
FIELD OF WATER POLICY , available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2000:327:0001:0072:EN:PDF.
119. Id. Art. 4, § 1(a)(i).
120. Id. Art. 4, § 1(a)(ii).
121. Id. Art. 2, § 9; William Howarth, Aspirations and Realities Under the Water
Framework Directive: Proceduralisation, Participation and Practicalities, 21 J. ENVTL . L.
391, 412 (2009).
122. Brian M oss, The Water Framework Directive: Total Environment or Political
Compromise?, 400 SCI. T OTAL ENVTL . 32, 34 (2008).
123. EUROP EAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 118, Annex V, Table 1.2.
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Putting aside the fact that the classification system in the Directive
may be both overly complex and ecologically naive,124 the Directive’s
“undisturbed conditions” touchstone poses problems in the context of
any dynamic system.125 It is particularly challenging in the context of
climate change, since it implies a level of fidelity to pre-industrialization
conditions that may literally prove unattainable. To reduce that problem,
some have argued that the classification system and reference conditions
should be periodically updated to take climate change into account.126
The Directive, then, would tie water quality standards to a “new normal,”
which would change over time, rather than to historic conditions.
The moving baseline approach has substantial intuitive appeal. It does
not demand the impossible.127 Furthermore, it recognizes the limited
reach of natural resource management authority, and avoids unfairly
penalizing resource managers for effects they cannot prevent. Germany,
for example, and its hydropower operators, can hardly be held fully
responsible for ecological changes in German rivers caused by fossil fuel
combustion in the United States and China.
But implementing a moving baseline poses daunting technical
problems, and provides ample opportunity for the sorts of political
manipulation that oak-like standards are intended to prevent. The further
the inquiry moves from the direct physical effects of climate change
toward the indirect ecological consequences, the trickier the technical
questions become. Because the ecological effects of climate change are
poorly understood and overlap with those of other threats,128 it will be
difficult to separate out climate change impacts. That presents regulators

124. See M oss, supra note 122, at 34–35 (criticizing reliance on water body typology,
lack of clear distinctions between “good” and “moderate” status, and use of ecological quality
ratios).
125. William Howarth, The Progression Towards Ecological Quality Standards, 18
J. ENVTL . L. 3, 23–27 (2006).
126. Peeter Noges et al., Impact of Climate Variability on Parameters Used in Typology
and Ecological Q uality Assess ment of Surface Water s—Im plications on the Water
Framework Directive, 584 HYDROBIOLOGIA 373, 375–77 (2007); see also Tristan HattonEllis, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Water Framework Directive, 18 AQUATIC CONSERVATION :
M ARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 111, 113 (2008). Actually, it is not quite clear what
rule Noges et al. would establish with respect to updating reference conditions; they call
for careful analysis of “which aspects of water quality might be given some flexibility and
which standards are so essential to our use and appreciation of water bodies that they should
be fixed, despite the impacts of climate change. Noges et al., supra, at 374.
127. That seems likely to be especially politically salient in light of the fact that the
majority, and in some cases the overwhelming majority, of waters in the member states
are not meeting their ecological objectives. M oss, supra note 122, at 38.
128. For a detailed analysis of the multiple potential effects of climate change on
European waters, see STEVEN J. EISENREICH , ED ., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE EUROP EAN
WATER DIMENSION, E.U. REPORT NO. 21553 (2005), available at http://ccu.jrc.it/Pubblications/
Climate_Change_and_the_European_Water_Dimension_2005.pdf.
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with the strong temptation to maximize the extent to which changes are
attributed to climate change, minimizing the extent to which restrictions
are imposed on other stressors.129
That sort of temptation would be even greater in the endangered
species context, because species are frequently threatened by a combination
of factors. Salmon, which are impacted by ocean conditions, spawning
habitat alteration, hatchery operations, harvest, and hydropower
development, are the classic example.130 Another current example is the
Delta smelt, which is impacted by pumping that diverts water for
agricultural and municipal use, but also by the presence of invasive
species, which have altered the food chain, by pesticide and nutrient
pollution, and by habitat modification.131 The relative contribution of
those various factors is difficult to evaluate, leading those who would
bear the costs of regulation of one factor to point fingers at, and demand
regulation of, the others.132
Indeed, the challenge of assigning responsibility is even greater in this
context, because other stressors may cause precisely the same effects as
climate change. Water temperatures, for example, can be increased by
flow alterations, diversions, removal of streamside vegetation, or industrial

129. Already, some observers see “a concerted attempt to minimise the effects of the
Directive.” M oss, supra note 122, at 39. Baseline revision in the face of uncertain evidence
would present a prime opportunity for that sort of minimization.
130. See, e.g., COMM. ON PROT. & M GMT. OF PAC. NW . ANADROMOUS SALMONIDS,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL , UP STREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
39–74 (1996) (detailing the effects of changing ocean conditions and a variety of human
activities on salmon).
131. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL , COMMITTEE ON SUSTAINABLE WATER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE CALIFORNIA BAY -DELTA , A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT
OF A LTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING WATER M ANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON T HREATENED AND
ENDANGERED FISHES IN CALIFORNIA ’S BAY DELTA 33–36 (2010) (noting stressors other
than water diversion that may have large effects on fish in the Bay-Delta).
132. The Coalition for a Sustainable Delta, composed of water users dependent on
Delta exports, has brought a series of lawsuits against those responsible for some other
stressors. See COALITION FOR A SUSTAINABLE DELTA , SACRAMENTO -SAN JOAQUIN DELTA
CRISIS, LEGAL , http://www.sustainabledelta.com/legal.html (providing documents related
to several lawsuits); Coalition for a Sustainable Delta v. FEM A, No. 1:09-CV-2024 OWW
DLB, 2010 WL 1904824, at *19 (E.D. Cal. M ay 10, 2010) (holding that organization lacked
standing to raise conservation and esthetic interests of its members). They and others
successfully advocated for appointment of a National Research Council committee to review,
among other things, the relative impacts of various stressors. The National Academies,
Current Projects System, Project Information, Sus t ainable Wat er and Environmental
M anagement in the California Bay-Delta, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.
aspx?key=49175.
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discharges.133 The problem, therefore, is not simply to identify the extent
to which each stressor contributes, it is to allocate the acceptable increment
among the various stressors. In setting a budget for other stressors,
regulators will have strong incentives to underforecast the likely extent
of climate change in order to maximize the space available to permit
conventional impacts. Experience under the Clean Air Act suggests that
temptation will be very difficult to resist.134 By the time it becomes
apparent that optimistic forecasts are wrong, it may be too late to avoid
overruns that carry irreversible impacts.
In order to address the serious political risks of a moving baseline
strategy, any such strategy would have to be accompanied by a range of
procedural safeguards. I discuss below what sort of procedural safeguards
might be possible and how they might help. Before getting to that,
however, there are other substantive strategies to consider.
2. Leaving Room for Nature
Another approach is to concentrate our conservation efforts on leaving
as much of the earth as untrammeled as we can manage, allowing nature
to respond in its own ways to climate change. Surely one of our
important conservation goals is simply to have some part of the world
moving to its own rhythms rather than to ours. Much of the esthetic and
spiritual value of nature, its ability to inspire and captivate us, is due to
the fact that it is not of our making or under our control.
Global warming is a powerful reminder that no part of today’s world
is unaffected by human actions, but that does not mean that wildness has
disappeared. Wildness persists anywhere people do not intentionally
control animals or direct the future of ecosystems. Where the local flora
and fauna decide for themselves where to forage, who to mate with, and
when to migrate, hibernate, or breed, nature remains wild, and retains its
capacity to inspire and instruct.
Focusing on protecting wild, autonomous nature also carries a
pragmatic benefit. Even if its rhythms have been drastically changed by
133. Johnston, supra note 87, at 155–56.
134. See Thomas O. M cGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air
Act’s VOC Emissions Reduction Program in Non-Attainment Areas, 18 VA . ENVTL . L.J.
41 (1999) (detailing the extent to which both non-attainment states and EPA have engaged in
optimistic projections about the extent of pollution and effectiveness of control measures);
James D. Fine and Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models
and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 959 (2005)
(pointing out that air pollution authorities in California’s San Joaquin Valley “placed heavy
reliance upon emissions reductions from rules imposed by other regulatory entities, and in
particular assumed that declining emissions from upwind areas would provide an important
boost toward compliance”).
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human impacts to the planet, nature which remains autonomous will
develop its own strategies for responding to human encroachment.
That may be especially important in a world going through an
unprecedented transition. Our ability to predict how climate disruption
will affect local temperature and precipitation patterns remains incomplete,
and we know very little about how the biota will respond to climatic
alterations. Our active management choices, therefore, might easily be
wrong. Leaving some places where nature, rather than humanity,
determines the details of the response to climate change is only sensible
under the circumstances.
Keeping some large areas as wild as possible should be an important
part, but not the totality, of our conservation strategy. Paleoecologist
Tony Barnosky makes a strong case for a dual focus in future conservation
policy.135 One prong, he says, should concentrate on creating, maintaining,
and connecting wildland reserves that would be managed with a handsoff approach. A network of wildland reserves would begin with the most
pristine current protected areas, joined to the extent possible by corridors
through which species could migrate to newly suitable climates, and
supplemented by the addition of new protected areas selected not for
their current inhabitants but for their lack of human manipulation. The
goal of the wildland reserves would be “to preserve ecological interactions
that have not been heavily influenced or managed by people, that is, a
fundamental wildness.” They would also supply open space and
accommodate low-impact recreation. The other focus would remain where
it currently is, on species protection.
The wildlands strategy, because it assumes that we would still want to
protect at least some current species or assemblages, would not wholly
solve the problem of what should replace the ESA oak. It might,
however, combine well with the moving baseline strategy, making it less
frightening to give up some of the ESA’s rigidity by offering a replacement
strategy that promises to be effective without being slavishly tied to
history. Having a strong wildlands strategy in the background might also
increase our willingness to engage in new forms of active management
like managed relocation for our highest priority species. Managed
relocation, also known as assisted migration, involves moving species to
areas outside their historic range in search of a suitable long-term

135. ANTHONY D. BARNOSKY , HEATSTROKE : NATURE IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL WARMING
193–209 (2009).
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climate niche.136 The strongest argument against managed relocation is
that it might unpredictably destabilize the receiving system. Knowing
that wildland reserves would be off-limits for such introductions could
facilitate experimentation in other places.137 Perhaps, too, reducing active
management of lower priority species or places could free up some
funding for creating and connecting new wildland reserves.
The wildlands strategy, as Barnosky describes it, has the great advantage
of not depending upon vague or indeterminate definitions, which have
plagued calls to protect ecosystems instead of, or in addition to, species.
The wildlands approach does not require that regulators determine what
qualifies as an “ecosystem” or what qualities one should display. They
would simply identify and set aside those lands least encroached upon
by human civilization.
Nonetheless, implementing the wildlands strategy would pose some
major challenges. The key questions would be which species or places to
give up on, what that would mean, and how much wildland to designate
in return. Like the moving baseline strategy, the wildlands strategy
would present the temptation to give up too much too easily, in return
for too little. It too, therefore, would require the institution of additional
procedural measures to ensure that it effectively disciplines, rather than
facilitates, careless development.
3. Other Management Endpoints
A variety of other conservation management targets have been
suggested. None seem to me attractive. They are either fundamentally
misdirected in the context of climate change, or too formless to
sufficiently constrain discretion in the face of high political winds.
The one that seems misdirected is resilience. Resilience is generally
understood to mean the ability to recover from a disturbance to something
close to the predisturbance condition.138 So defined, it is a poor primary
target for conservation in a world of change. Under climate change,
136. For a description of managed relocation and the risks it presents, see Alejandro E.
Camacho et al., Reassessing Conservation Goals in a Changing Climate, ISSUES IN SCI. &
T ECH . 21 (Summer 2010).
137. See BARNOSKY , supra note 136, at 207 (suggesting that it might be appropriate
to transplant a desired species from its historic range to another area “where human impact on
the landscape already has been heavy,” but not to the more pristine areas he would
designate as wildland preserves).
138. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH , PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAP TATION OP TIONS FOR CLIMATE SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 9–16 (2008) (Resilience is the ability of a system to
return to its initial state and function in spite of some major perturbation.”), available at
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/s ap /s ap4-4/final-report/s ap4-4-final-report-Ch9Synthesis.pdf.
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departure from historic conditions is the new normal, not a temporary
aberration. We must learn to manage free of the mooring of historical
conditions, rather than obsess over returning to them. It is true, as my
colleague Dan Farber reminds me, that climate disruption will increase
the frequency of disturbances like storms, fires, and floods. It will be
even more important than it currently is to ensure that our conserved
areas and systems can withstand such events. But the term resilience is
easily misinterpreted as calling for maintaining systems in relatively
static condition outside such disturbance events, which is no longer a
viable strategy. The promoters of a resilience strategy may well envision
something much like the wildlands strategy, focused simply on maintaining
natural systems that can function without constant human oversight and
intervention. That is a useful strategy, but the rhetoric of resilience does
not advance its cause.
Robin Craig has suggested “adaptive capacity” as an additional
management goal.139 Professor Craig does not argue that adaptive
capacity itself provides a measurable or enforceable target, but rather
sees it as the basis for some general management principles.140 She first
describes adaptive capacity by borrowing a definition of resilience,141
but then distinguishes it from resilience in the following terms: “Resilience
reflects a system’s ability to absorb impacts and continue to function,
while adaptive capacity refers to a system’s ability to change to adjust to
new conditions.”142 That sounds more like what is needed in the face of
climate change than resilience. As Professor Craig envisions it, “adaptive
capacity” seems closely related to the wildland, “hands-off,” strategy of
letting nature be natural: “we should restructure environmental and
natural resources law to give as many species and systems as possible
the best chance to survive and adapt to whatever changes come.”143 The
easiest way to do that, it would seem, is to set aside as much space as

139. Craig, Stationarity, supra note 104, at 39.
140. Id. at 40–70.
141. Id. at 22: “[A]daptive capacity refers to ‘the regenerative ability of ecosystems
and their capability in the face of change to continue to deliver resources and ecosystem
services that are essential for human livelihoods and societal development.’” The quote
comes from W. Neil Adger et al., Socio-Ecological Resilience to Coastal Disasters, 309
SCIENCE 1036, 1036 (2005), but the quoted passage is explaining what the authors mean
by “resilience.”
142. Craig, Stationarity, supra note 104, at 22.
143. Id. at 39.
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possible for nature to run with minimal interference. An adaptive capacity
framework probably would look much like a wildland-focused strategy.
Others have suggested that biodiversity, ecological processes, or
ecosystem services should be targets of conservation policy. Each of
these concepts, however, suffers from a notorious lack of clarity, making
them far less than ideal as enforceable targets of law.144 Turning them
into useful standards would require specifying much more clearly what
range of creatures, types of processes, or ecosystem services we want to
protect. Without that, they cannot hold a reluctant agency’s feet to the
regulatory fire.
4. Focusing on Feasibility
An altogether different type of strategy would focus on the feasibility
of conservation efforts rather than trying to set a firm conservation
endpoint. Just as technology-based pollution regulation avoids the
difficulty of identifying health-based standards, feasibility-based
conservation could evade the challenge of setting conservation
endpoints. While the information demands of feasibility standards are
not insignificant, they are less than those of identifying endpoints.145
Feasibility-based standards are also potentially clearer, easier to enforce,
and less subject to the agency discretion that courts political temptation.146
Furthermore, they invoke what Carol Rose calls the “rhetoric of
responsibility—a principle that everyone should be doing her best not to
pollute.”
Feasibility standards might seem less well fitted for conservation than
for pollution control, but that is not necessarily the case. Best management
practices, for example, are no mystery for many activities with conservation
implications, including land development, timber harvest, and agriculture.147

144. As Oliver Houck might say, these concepts are sufficiently malleable that, without
further definition, they provide little or no “law to apply.” Houck, supra note 114, at 871.
See also Dale D. Goble, What Are Slugs Good For? Ecosystem Services and the Conservation
of Biodiversity, 22 J. L. USE & ENVTL . L 411, 414–17 (2007) (describing the lack of clarity of
“biodiversity”); id. at 417 (noting that “ecosystem services” cannot be objectively measured);
id. at 423 (“definitions of ecosystem services tend to be overly general”).
145. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation
of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN . L. REV. 1267
(1985); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. M cGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale
for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729; Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL . L. REV. 83, 96.
146. Wagner, supra note 146, at 103.
147. Cf. OLIVER A. HOUCK , THE CLEAN WATER ACT TM DL PROGRAM: LAW , POLICY ,
AND IMP LEMENTATION 87 (2d ed., 2002) (noting that control technologies for nonpoint source
water pollution “are anything but unknown, complex, technologically difficult, or even very
costly”).

78

D OREMUS (D O N O T D EL ET E)

[VOL . 2: 45, 2010]

3/7/2016 11:27 AM

Adapting to Climate Change
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

They have not been aggressively required because the political will and
institutional structure to mandate them have been lacking. One could
imagine much more aggressive use of feasibility-based standards, such
as mandating that irrigators who use water from projects that affect
endangered species implement efficient water practices, or even that
they grow water-efficient crops.
While feasibility standards could be more of a factor, they cannot provide
a complete answer to conservation problems. Feasibility standards cannot
ensure that any particular substantive thresholds are not crossed. They
cannot resolve problems where the fundamental conflict is competition
for limited resources. If our conservation goals include keeping a
minimum amount of any kind of nature around, feasibility standards
alone will not be enough. They should be seen, therefore, as a useful
supplement to other standards, but not as a stand-alone strategy.
5. Combining Strategies
The moving baseline, wildlands, and feasibility strategies could usefully
be combined. For example, the beneficiaries of moving baselines could
be required to mitigate the impacts of activities they gain permission to
conduct by contributing funds to the purchase of wildlands. Baseline
migration should not be free to the beneficiaries, lest they demand too
much of it. Attaching mitigation costs would not be unfair because the
beneficiaries are, by definition, undertaking activities with harmful
environmental consequences. The only uncertainty is whether some
level of harm would be unavoidable even without their contribution. For
much the same reason, the beneficiaries should be required to minimize
and mitigate their impacts to the extent feasible.
C. Procedural Strategies
Giving up the rigidity of oak-like standards is frightening for conservation
advocates, and properly so. Those standards have a history of being the
only effective mechanism for forcing agencies who would otherwise bow
to the prevailing political winds to fulfill their conservation mandates. Even
with them in place there has been considerable slippage. At this point,
however, there is no choice but to sacrifice some rigidity. Rigid standards
based on the past can no longer stand. Perhaps the best we can do is to
adopt standards that are flexible but not formless, such as moving
baselines, wildlands set-asides, and feasibility-based requirements,
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and combine them with procedures that will encourage their robust
implementation.
1. Adaptive Management
Virtually all observers agree that adaptive management must have a
role in conservation policy in the warming world.148 Adaptive management
means “learning while doing.”149 It calls on resource managers or regulators
to monitor the outcomes of their choices, evaluate those outcomes in
light of their conceptual understanding of the system, and adjust both
their understanding and their next round of management choices
accordingly.150 Conceptually, it is obviously a good fit for a world in
transition.
But adaptive management can be the flimsiest of reeds when the
political winds come up. “Agencies can use claims of adaptive management
as a ploy to placate demands for environmental protection without
actually imposing any enforceable constraints on themselves.”151 And so
they have done. In practice, adaptive management “has descended into a
vague promise of future adjustments without clear standards.”152 Rather
than facilitating learning and adjustment, adaptive management in
practice “may be a pretext for postponing difficult but important decisions
in order to dodge the constraints of budgets, politics, or scientific
uncertainty.”153 Adaptive management is not a bulwark that can help
stiffen the resolve of an agency whose discretion is not constrained by
indeterminate substantive standards. Rather, the inevitability of incorporating
adaptive management in future conservation policy increases the need
for other strengthening procedural mechanisms.

148. E.g., Craig, Stationarity, supra note 104, at 65 (“climate change adaptation is the
quintessential adaptive management problem); Glicksman, supra note 81, at 868; Alejandro
E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a
Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 39 (2009) (“Adaptive management is a particularly
useful strategy for managing the uncertainty of climate change.”).
149. Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science and L ear ning While Doing in Natural
Resource Management, 82 WASH . L. REV. 547, 550 (2007).
150. For a more elaborate description, see J.B. Ruhl and Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive
Management in the Courts 7–9, (M inn. L. Rev. Working Paper, Vol.5 No. 2, Jan. 26,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/absrtact=1542632.
151. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53
(2001).
152. Ruhl and Fischman, supra note 151, at 13.
153. Id. at 22.
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2. Chutes and Ladders
Richard Lazarus advocates a political system of “chutes and ladders”
for climate change regulation, employing asymmetric barriers to increase
the power of diffuse environmental interests and decrease the power of
focused economic interests to help the present protect the future.154 The
chutes and ladders concept recognizes that some change will be needed,
trying to facilitate desirable (strengthening) changes while impeding
undesirable (weakening) ones.
Professor Lazarus’s framework is useful for adaptation as well, but
that context is an especially challenging one because it requires allowing
some weakening changes without letting those changes be made too
easily or go too far. Because some discretion must be allowed, procedural
strategies should seek to level the political playing field to protect the
agencies from pressure to underestimate conservation opportunities or
overestimate conservation challenges. Indeed, the political playing field
ought to be skewed to some extent in favor of conservation, since we
know that temptations enjoy a natural political and psychological
advantage.
Congress will have to be involved in this process, because the mandates
that will have to be relaxed are statutorily grounded.155 Environmental
interests must closely monitor the legislative process, but they are
relatively good at that at the national level. They will want to make sure
that the terms of any relaxation do not go too far, and that it is
accompanied by needed procedural constraints.
Nonetheless, most key conservation decisions in the coming decades
will be made at the administrative agency level, as they have been for
the last several decades. Procedural strategies, therefore, should be
primarily aimed at agency actors, and designed to be effective as
precommitments. Four general strategies are likely to be useful: putting
a thumb on the commitment side of the scales; placing people and
154. Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1194–95.
155. The rigid mandates of the ESA are entirely statutory. The Clean Water Act’s
antidegradation provisions are made explicit only in EPA’s regulations, but the statute
explicitly requires that “any water quality standard . . . may be revised only if such revision is
subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy established under this section.”
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000). Furthermore, the antidegradation policy precedes the
modern Clean Water Act, and “the existence of some form of antidegradation requirement
under the Act is evident” from its goals of restoring and maintaining the integrity of the
nation’s waters. Jeffrey M . Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards
Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND . L. REV. 1167, 1191 (1983).
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agencies with a conservation mission in key decisionmaking roles;
enhancing the political independence of those conservation decisionmakers;
and facilitating outside oversight by conservation interests.
a. Put a Thumb on the Scales
As explained earlier, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the
effects of climate change on natural systems, and about the relative
effects of climate change and more traditional impacts.156 Because the
uncertainties are so great, technical expertise, while important, will not
be the critical factor in decisionmaking. Instead, two types of judgments
will be critical: judgments interpreting the uncertain evidence, and
judgments about the appropriate burden of proof. Because we know,
from psychology and from history, that conservation is likely to be
undervalued in those judgments, the burden of proof should favor
conservation. If a moving baseline is adopted, for example, the baseline
should not be adjusted without clear and convincing evidence that
changes are in fact attributable to climate change. If feasibility-based
standards are used, the burden should be on the regulated community to
establish that they cannot do more, rather than on the government to
establish that they can.
Another aspect of putting a thumb on the scales in favor of conservation
is making it difficult to escape our conservation commitments. If
emergency relief valves are necessary they should be, like the God
Squad, difficult to invoke. We should also avoid relying on relief valves
as flexibility mechanisms. While they may forestall the repeal of key
statutes in times of temporary stress, pressure relief valves are not
designed as planning devices. In the warming world, we will have to
choose some species over others and decide when to relax requirements
to maintain baseline environmental conditions. We should design
mechanisms for addressing those difficult choices in advance rather than
facing them only at moments of crisis, when tensions between conservation
and other goals reach a boiling point. Advance planning can help us
avoid or reduce crises, as well providing opportunities for taking input
and considering the big picture. Reacting to crisis is not a recipe for
thoughtful decisionmaking when tradeoffs are necessary.
b. Choose Conservation-Minded Decisionmakers
Judgments about how to interpret equivocal data “inevitably depend
upon the values, experience, and professional norms of the decision
156.
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maker.”157 Key decisions about whether and to what extent to relax
baseline regulatory standards, therefore, should rest with agencies and
decisionmakers who can be counted on to put their conservation mission
ahead of political pressures or economic convenience. That means that
conservation agencies, rather than those with a development, water supply,
or resource extraction mission, should have primary decisionmaking
authority. It also means that conservation scientists, rather than political
appointees, should have the first opportunity to make decisions. There is
little danger that economic interests will be given insufficient weight;
should that genuinely be the case it would always remain open to Congress
to change the regulatory landscape.
c. Provide Political Insulation
Any steps that insulate those charged with key decisions such as
whether to relax a conservation baseline from focused political pressures
would help strengthen precomittment. Giving those decisions in the first
instance to career employees provides one measure of insulation. To
make it effective, that step should be combined with transparency,
allowing the public to see what decision the career employees would have
made and how the political appointees altered that decision. Involving
outside expert committees or reviewers can also provide a measure of
political cover. It will be easier for an agency to make a politically tough
decision in accordance with the public recommendation of independent
experts than on its own initiative.158
d. Facilitate Outside Oversight
Finally, facilitating oversight of decisions can help ensure that
agencies follow their mission rather than responding to political
pressures in tension with that mission. Involvement of environmental
groups has been crucial to the success of environmental law throughout
its history, as has involvement of the courts. Oversight is complicated
by two factors, each of which should be addressed. First, diffuse
environmental interests tend to lack resources, especially at the level of
the agency field office, where key management decisions are often
157. Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the
Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 278 (2005).
158. Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1220–21.

83

D OREMUS (D O N O T D EL ET E)

3/7/2016 11:27 AM

made. Grants and technical assistance aimed at local citizen groups or
local chapters of national groups could help reduce that barrier.159
Second, judicial review will inevitably become more difficult if more
discretionary standards are adopted. Congress can reduce this problem
by directing courts to apply searching review to decisions relaxing
environmental protection. The standard of judicial review should be
deliberately made asymmetric, so that courts stand as a barrier to
unnecessary relaxation of standards, but not to decisions to stiffen or
maintain standards.160
V. CONCLUSION
The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is bringing
climatic changes that will severely challenge human and non-human
communities alike. Human needs will bring a response, even if they are
recognized late and even if the costs of responding are high.161 Nature,
however, is a different matter. Unless we plan now to resist future
temptation, it will be all too easy to ignore the gathering problems until a
crisis hits, and at that point to abandon our conservation commitment in
favor of nature will be all too easily ignored until a crisis hits, and then
decried as too expensive to save. Strong precommitment is therefore
even more essential to conservation in the warming world than it has
been in the past.
Unfortunately, climate disruption makes effective precommitment
more difficult. The warming world can no longer be protected by our
established regulatory oaks. Rather than wait until they topple to plant
alternatives, we should identify and begin cultivating those replacements
now. We need standards that better match a world in transition, which
means we need standards that can change to reflect new realities. But
malleable standards are just that: malleable. They are potentially subject
to manipulation when agencies face difficult choices. That makes them
imperfect, to say the least, as precommitment devices. Nonetheless, it
may be that a combination of substantive and procedural strategies can
be used to construct law that acknowledges the prevailing winds of
159. See Lee P . Breckenridge, Nonprofit Envir onm ental O r ganiz ations and
the Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 692, 695–
99 (1999).
160. Cf. Lazarus, Super Wicked, supra note 4, at 1229–31 (arguing that judicial
review should be preferentially available for some decisions but not for others).
161. See Holly Doremus and M ichael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water
Management in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL . L. & POL ’Y 55, 60 (2008) (“As a
species, Homo sapiens is nothing if not adaptable, and the United States has the
additional advantage of wealth. We are confident that America will respond to the most
important of human needs for water.”).
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climate change without toppling or becoming utterly formless. Intimidating
as it seems, we have no choice but to begin a serious search for law
modeled on the wind-swept pine to replace our doomed oaks.

85

